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Abstract 
This article is concerned with some cross-linguistic asymmetries in the use of two types of 
time metaphors, the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego metaphor. The latter metaphor 
appears to be far less well-entrenched in languages such as Croatian or Hungarian, i.e. 
some of its lexicalizations are less natural than their alternatives based on the Moving-
Time metaphor, while some others are, unlike their English models, downright 
unacceptable. It is argued that some of the differences can be related to the status of the 
fictive motion construction and some restrictions on the choice of verbs in that 
construction. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the history of contrastive linguistics several, in part complementary, 
procedures have been used. Researchers relied in some cases on intuitive data 
(provided by the researcher), just as was done in the beginnings of cognitive 
linguistics, and still is. Secondly, researchers combined intuition with elicitation, 
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i.e. they asked native speakers to provide equivalents for the items they were 
interested in. However, the most widely used procedure in contrastive linguistics 
at its heyday was translation. We are of course aware of the fact that translation 
data may contain a certain amount of “noise”, i.e. translations may be skewed 
due to some intrinsic aspects of the translation process, e.g. the parallels between 
languages may be distorted due to a whole range of reasons, among which 
stylistic factors may be very important. However, when we eliminate such “non-
systematic” causes of variation, we may be able to observe some interesting 
correlations. 
The initial wave of cross-linguistic work in cognitive linguistics, especially 
cross-linguistic comparisons in the domain of figurative speech, i.e. metaphor 
and metonymy, appears to have repeated history in being based primarily on 
intuition and translation. Data gained through the translation method proved to 
be a very useful complement to other types of data in cognitive linguistics, 
bridging the gap between intuition and more empirical sources of data such as 
corpus-based research, the study of language acquisition, or contrastive and 
typological research. Naturally, this applies to research on metaphor and other 
figurative expressions as well.  
Not surprisingly, this methodology worked well because early contrastive 
cognitive linguistic research focused on cross-linguistic similarity, i.e. its intent 
was to demonstrate the universal character of image schemas, conceptual 
metaphors and metonymies, etc. Researchers usually concentrated on similarity 
(i.e. on the universality of the above) rather than contrasts, and when some 
cross-linguistic differences were discussed they tended to be only isolated 
contrasts that were, at best, motivated on a one-to-one, ad hoc basis. 
Let us now illustrate what the classic translational method might uncover 
when applied to a cross-linguistic study of conceptual metaphors. As in the case 
of all figurative expressions, including metaphors, there are three major 
possibilities when it comes to their translation: 
 
Table 1. Overview of the general possibilities in translating figurative expressions  
by figurative or by non-figurative expressions, and vice versa. 
 
           source text/   
        language 
   
 
    target text/ 
    language 
      non-figurative 
               expression 
 
    figurative 
   expression 
               figurative  
                expression 
  non-figurative  
  expression 
              figurative       
              expression 
    figurative 
    expression 
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Naturally, we are not interested in the translation of non-figurative expressions 
by non-figurative expressions, so this fourth possibility is not in our table.  
Most of the time cross-linguistic comparisons of metaphors or metonymies 
resulted in contrastive statements of the type: “for a metaphorical/metonymic 
expression x/type X in language A there is an/no equivalent 
metaphorical/metonymic expression x/type X in language B”. Specifically, a 
metaphorical expression can be translated by means of an equivalent 
metaphorical expression (the lower right-hand part of the table) or not (the lower 
left-hand part of the table). Of course it is also possible for a non-metaphorical 
expression to be translated by a metaphorical one (the upper right-handed part of 
the table), but such cases are not very likely to be discovered by a unidirectional 
contrastive research based on a classic translational method. They would come 
to the light if we reverse the source and the goal language of the translation, but 
unless we adopt a bi-directional approach, the cases in the lower left-hand part 
of the table would fall beneath the radar. 
However, there is lot more in the possibility described in the medium heavily 
shaded part of the table in the lower right hand in terms of contrastive 
significance than meets the eye. Appearances are deceptive and things are not as 
simple as they might seem at first blush. As pointed out by Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk (1987, 2010), languages often structure conceptual content in more 
or less different ways, i.e. asymmetrically, and as a result of this, interlingual 
translation involves “(re)calibration” aimed at optimisation of conceptual 
analogousness (cf. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2010: 22) where an expression 
in one language covers a different portion of conceptual-semantic material than 
in another language. This applies to the translation of metaphors as well, and can 
easily be demonstrated. 
Mandelblit’s (1995) Cognitive Translation Hypothesis provides for two 
possible scenarios in the translation of metaphors. Similar Mapping Condition 
obtains if no conceptual shift occurs between languages, while in the case of 
Different Mapping Condition a conceptual shift takes place from source 
language to target language. In order to check the difference between the two 
scenarios, Mandelblit (1995: 493) used the time parameter, and concluded that 
“the difference in reaction time is due to a conceptual shift that the translator is 
required to make between the conceptual mapping systems of the source and 
target languages.” She has found that metaphorical expressions take more time 
and are more difficult to translate if they exploit a cognitive domain quite 
different from that of the target language equivalent expression. This was also 
confirmed by Tirkkonen-Condit’s (2002) study. 
But the distance/difference between the two domains need not be 
immediately clear. As an illustration of the magnitude of the problem of 
translating metaphors, we just point to an example discussed by Ahrens and Say 
(1999: 100). When Liu Tai-ying, the Chairman of the China Development Corp, 
called George Soros, the international financier, a ‘pig’, it was necessary for the 
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English-language China News to modify the quote, adding the information that 
‘a pig is the Mandarin equivalent of an idiot’ (China News, October 7, 1998). 
Without this information, English readers would interpret the metaphorical 
expression to mean that Soros is a greedy person, as opposed to the intended 
meaning of ‘a stupid person’, which is the entrenched meaning of this metaphor 
in Chinese. The Hungarian counterpart of pig, disznó, can be used 
metaphorically to refer to a human with disgusting, unpleasant characteristics. 
The same applies to Croatian (cf. Milić 2008: 90–91). 
While in the above case the problem is caused by the fact that the same 
metaphor vehicle belonging to the same source domain is linked to a (slightly) 
different target domain, the asymmetry or the contrast may be less conspicuous. 
It is possible for a metaphorical/metonymic expression x/type X in language A 
to be translated by a metaphorical/metonymic expression y/type Y in language 
B. In other words, a metaphor vehicle denoting a concept associated with a given 
source domain may be translated by a different metaphor vehicle associated with 
a more or less different source domain while the target domain is shared by both 
languages. In our case, a time metaphor based on a given lexeme x may be 
translated by (i.e. may be equivalent to) a time metaphor based on a lexeme y 
that is not directly equivalent to x. As a variation on this theme on a more 
general level, we note that a time metaphor of the type X, expressed by some 
lexeme x, may be translated by (i.e. may be equivalent to) a time metaphor of 
the type Y, expressed by some lexeme y that is not directly equivalent to x. In 
theory, as a twist on the above, it is also possible that a time metaphor of the 
type X, expressed by some lexeme x, may be translated by (i.e. may be 
equivalent to) a time metaphor of the type Y, expressed by a lexeme x that is 
directly equivalent to x. In other words, it is possible that we have two 
submetaphors sharing the same source and target domain, and in the limiting 
case, also sharing the lexical expression (the differences showing in different 
mappings). In all these case we will end up with a formally asymmetric 
rendering of the conceptual content. 
There is, however, another, subtler dimension of asymmetry that needs to be 
addressed here. Let us assume that two or more languages (L1, L2, Ln) exhibit 
two or more submetaphors (sM) related to a more general metaphor (M) such 
that respective realizations of the submetaphors in question in different 
languages are apparently direct equivalents of each other (indicated by the 
symbol ≡ between the cells in the table): 
  
Table 2. The system of equivalent submetaphors across languages. 
 
M 
L1 L2 Ln 
sM1 – ExL1 sM1 – ExL2 sM1 – ExL3 
sM2 – EyL1 sM2 – EyL2 sM2 – EyL3 
sM3 – EzL1 sM3 – EzL2 sM3 – EzL3 
 Moving-Time and Moving-Ego Metaphors…  195 
 
It is, however, possible that while the submetaphors in question may be 
structurally, functionally and translationally equivalent, their distribution may be 
different across languages, i.e. sM1 may be far more frequent than sM2, or sM3 in 
L1, or more frequent than sM1 in L2 or L3. This means that instead of the seeming 
equivalence between submetaphors in different languages we should be better 
advised to assume just approximation. In de Saussurean terms, although two 
submetaphors, sM1 from L1 and sM2 from L2 may be exact translations and 
contrastive equivalents of each other, i.e. be perfectly equivalent on a one-to-one 
basis, outside their metaphorical systems, their value within their respective 
system is different.  
What follows in Section 2 is a study on conceptual metaphors of time in a 
cross-linguistic perspective. More specifically, it is a study on the subsystem of 
the time motion metaphors with its two submetaphors, the Moving-Time and the 
Moving-Ego metaphors. After providing some background on these two time 
metaphors we demonstrate that asymmetric situations of the type discussed 
above may obtain in the course of translating conceptual metaphors of time from 
one language into another (and back). A similar type of asymmetry is also found 
concerning the frequency of the two types of time metaphors in various 
languages. In Section 3, we consider some factors that may motivate this 
asymmetry. We first consider whether the two metaphors in question actually 
have a different status in the sense that one of them is not primary. While Grady 
(1997a, b) considers them to be primary metaphors, Evans (2003) argues that 
they are both complex metaphorical models. The differences are attributed in 
part to different cultural models of proactivity or passivity, but also to semantic 
clash brought about by not adhering to the folk model of time and its default 
assignment of roles of Figure and Ground in the Moving Ego metaphor. The 
same counterintuitive assignment of these two roles is observed in the fictive 
motion construction of the coextension path type, which is the mirror image of 
the Moving Time metaphor, which means that there is a correlation between the 
lower frequency of the Moving Ego, on the one hand, and the constraints on the 
fictive motion construction, on the other, as corroborated by Japanese, Croatian, 
Hungarian and German data. 
 
 
2. Time metaphors 
 
There are many ways in which time can be metaphorically conceived, as 
resource (We’re out of time), as money (as a special case of the former, as in 
Yesterday is a canceled check; tomorrow is a promissory note; today is the only 
cash you have, so spend it wisely, Kay Lyons), as container (We usually took 
what takes about a month of preparation, and we did it in five days), human 
(Time is a great teacher, but unfortunately it kills all its pupils, Hector Berlioz; 
Prince, I warn you, under the rose,/Time is the thief you cannot banish, Phyllis 
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McGinley, “Ballad of Lost Objects”) as well as motion (TIME IS MOTION), etc. 
According to the relevant static or dynamic reference point metaphorical models 
of time can be classified as Ego-Reference-Point models (where the Ego’s 
location is the “now”), or as Time-Reference-Point models (where earlier event 
are in front of later events the Reference Point (cf. Núñez and Sweetser, 2006; 
Moore, 2014). 
When it comes to the Ego-Reference-Point models, it is usual to draw a 
distinction between Moving-Time and Moving-Ego metaphors (Clark, 1973; 
Gentner, 2001; Evans, 2003; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; 
Traugott, 1978). We make use of the former when we conceptualize time events 
as moving with respect to a fixed observer from front (future) to back (past) as 
in: 
 
(1)  Christmas is approaching. 
(2) Holidays are coming. 
(3) New Year is coming to us soon. 
(4) Time passes so quickly. 
(5) The summer went by. 
 
Time is viewed here as an object moving with respect to the observer, and the 
metaphor can be fully spelled out as TIME PASSING IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT.  
The latter metaphor is exemplified by: 
 
(6) We are approaching Christmas. 
(7) … we are coming to holidays and we have more traffic to deal with... 
(8) As we are getting closer to the end of the year… 
(9) Those sad days are behind us. 
(10) Thanksgiving is looming on the horizon. 
 
In this subtype the observer moves forward towards fixed (future) time events, 
fully spelled as TIME PASSING IS AN OBSERVER’S MOTION OVER A LANDSCAPE.  
In an informal translation task 20 MA students majoring in English at the 
University of Osijek (either 2nd or 3rd year), whose mother tongue is Croatian, 
were asked to provide a most natural sounding translation of the following text: 
 
(11a)  Loyal supporters of Nourish, Creaseys Chartered Accountants of 
Lonsdale Gardens, Tunbridge Wells recently supplemented their 
monthly donation with the thoughtful addition of Easter Eggs. As 
Assistant Client Manager Louise Tunstall explained: “As we were 
approaching Easter it occurred to us that many local families would not 
be able to afford Easter Eggs so we asked everyone here whether they 
would like to donate some kind of Easter treat as well as the usual food 
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items. Everyone was really enthusiastic about the idea and we ended up 
with a really good collection.2  
 
 
The students, who had taken no cognitive linguistics course and were therefore 
unlikely to know anything about the way cognitive linguistic approach 
conceptual metaphors, let alone anything about metaphors of time, were told that 
this task formed part of a wider research on translation practice. Our focus of 
attention was an adverbial clause in the middle of the text in which time was 
construed metaphorically, viz. As we were approaching Easter. The majority of 
students, i.e. 16 out of 20, did not provide a translation that follows the original 
as closely as possible. They changed the role of the Croatian equivalent of 
Easter, Uskrs, in their translations, promoting it to the subject of the 
corresponding adverbial clause: 
 
(11b) Kako se približava Uskrs,... 
  ’As Easter is approaching’ 
 
The rest, i.e. 4 students, followed in their translations the original as closely as 
possible: 
 
(11c) Kako smo se približavali Uskrsu 
 ‘As we were approaching Easter’ 
 
When another group of 10 students were asked to translate (11b) back into 
English, none of the respondents provided the original, As we were approaching 
Easter, but only As Easter is approaching/getting nearer, etc.  
This means that our translators exhibited an interesting pattern – although 
two variants are in theory available in both languages, offering the possibility of 
pairing them in a 1:1 way, they clearly preferred the variant in which time is 
moving metaphorically in both languages. In other words, they produced an 
asymmetric situation in the sense of Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1987, 2010). 
Grady (1997b: 119) allows (though reluctantly) both of these metaphors to be 
primary ones. Recognizing them as primary also means that they are very likely 
to be universal, i.e. they are to be found in very many languages (Grady, 1997a: 
228). Moore (2010: 87) notes that 
 
… the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors have been observed in various unrelated 
languages around the world, and according to conceptual metaphor theory, part of the 
explanation for this type of widespread crosslinguistic commonality is that the experiential 
basis of the metaphor is available in all of the relevant cultures around the world. 
                                                          
2
  http://www.nourishcommunityfoodbank.org.uk/docs/Nourish_Community_Foodbank_-
_Apr_14.pdf, accessed on 1 February 2017 
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Moore (2014: 13) states that “Moving Ego and Ego-centered Moving Time 
occur repeatedly – with the same inference patterns – in language after language 
around the world,” but only gives examples from various languages for the 
latter. 
However, according to Sinha et al. (2011), both Moving-Time and Moving-
Ego metaphors are lacking in Amondawa. Note also that Núñez and Sweetser 
(2006) show that Aymara, an Amerindian language spoken in the Andean 
highlands of Bolivia, Peru and Chile, does not have dynamic models of time. 
The Aymara language instead has a major static model of time wherein FUTURE 
IS BEHIND EGO and PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO. 
But even if these submetaphors were primary, and nearly universal, the 
question is whether they are equally natural and/or frequent in all languages. 
Gentner, Imai & Boroditsky (2002) report a number of interesting observations. 
They found that their subjects took longer to respond to items that used the 
Moving-Time metaphor than to those that used the Moving-Ego metaphor. In 
one of their experiments they observed spontaneous conversion from the 
Moving-Time to the Moving-Ego metaphor; such conversions never occurred in 
the reverse direction. Similarly, Huang & Hsieh (2007) report that Chinese 
speakers when tested in their native tongue, process Moving-Ego metaphors 
faster. But when the same subjects were tested in English (as L2), they 
conceptualized Moving-Time metaphors much better. Both of these studies seem 
to suggest that the Moving-Ego metaphor is somehow easier or more natural for 
English. 
Unsurprisingly, both submetaphors are attested in a range of languages, and 
this can be easily verified by translating some of the above examples from 
English. Cf. first some examples from Croatian: 
 
(12a) a. Božić se približava. ‘Christmas is approaching’ 
 b. Približavamo se Božiću. ‘We are approaching Christmas’ 
 
(12b) a. Bliži se Uskrs. ‘Easter is getting nearer’ 
 b. Bližimo se Uskrsu. ‘We are nearing Easter’ 
 
Apparently, some combinations of motion verbs and temporal nouns do not 
agree with the Moving-Ego metaphor in Croatian: 
 
(13) a. Praznici dolaze. ‘Holidays are coming’ 
 b. *Dolazimo praznicima. ‘We are coming to holidays’ 
 
On top of that, there are also clear differences in the frequency of the use of the 
two metaphors, the expressions of the Moving-Ego being quite rare, to say the 
least, which is in complete agreement with the asymmetry in the translation task 
above:  
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Table 3. Differences in the frequency of some instances of the Moving-Time  
and the Moving-Ego metaphors in Croatian. 
 
 
Google3 hrWac4 
“Božić se bliži” ‘Christmas is getting closer’ 3,070 25 
“Bližimo se Božiću” ‘We are getting closer to Christmas’ 5 0 
“Božić se približava” ‘Christmas is approaching’ 1,040 9 
“Približavamo se Božiću” ‘We are approaching Christmas’ 114 0 
“Nova godina je pred/ Nova je godina pred” ‘New Year is in front 
of’ 
112/24 17 
“pred Novom smo godinom/smo pred Novom godinom” ‘we are 
in front of New Year’ 
2/0 0/0 
“došla je Nova godina”/ “Nova godina je došla” 56/51 0/0 
“došli smo do Nove godine” / “došli do Nove godine” 2/3 0/0 
 
It is often pointed out in the literature that examples with ahead can be 
ambiguous between the two models. The Croatian preposition pred ‘before, in 
front of’ might be claimed to be similar to ahead in this respect, but note that 
“Nova godina je pred/Nova je godina pred”, the more frequent construction, is 
more likely to be interpreted as exemplifying the Moving Time metaphor. It is 
also interesting to add that the New Year’s Eve party is rendered in Croatian by 
means of the nominalization doček Nove godine, which literally means 
‘welcome of New Year,’ making it clear that it is the new Year that is 
conceptualized as moving and coming to us, and not the other way round. 
In short, sentences such as (12a:b) and (12b:b) are acceptable as translations, 
i.e. they are structurally and functionally equivalent to their English models, but 
they are not of the same weight as their English models. There does not obtain 
statistical equivalence between them in the sense of Krzeszowski (1991).5 They 
are not natural choices and certainly sound more marked than (12a:a) and 
                                                          
3  Exact Google queries were performed in which quotation marks were used as operators 
forcing Google to return only the exact matches of what is enclosed within them. 
4  This is a web corpus collected from the .hr top-level domain. The current version of the corpus 
(v2.0) contains 1.9 billion tokens and is annotated with the lemma, morphosyntax and 
dependency syntax layers (Ljubešić and Klubička, 2014). 
5  Among several types of equivalence that Krzeszowski (1991) discusses, we also find statistical 
equivalence. He claims that this sort of equivalence obtains between elements that have 
“maximally similar frequencies of occurrence” in their respective 2-text corpora in addition to 
semantic and/or formal similarity or equivalence (1991: 27). 
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(12b:a). It is therefore not surprising that the Moving-Ego metaphor is often 
replaced in translation by the Moving-Time metaphor. 
Hungarian is in this respect very similar to Croatian. More or less literal 
translations of the English examples (1) and (6) are acceptable, as shown by (14) 
a. and b., respectively (cf. also Kövecses, 2005: 52): 
 
(14) a. Rohamosan közeledik a Karácsony. ‘Christmas is approaching  
  apace’ 
 b. Lassan közeledünk a Karácsonyhoz. ‘We are slowly approaching  
  Christmas’ 
 
However, translations of similar examples with a more typical motion verb 
apparently do not agree with the Moving-Ego metaphor in Hungarian, either 
 
(15) a. Jönnek az ünnepek. ‘Holidays are coming’ 
 b. *Az ünnepekhez jövunk. ‘We are coming to holidays’ 
 
The Moving-Ego is not compatible even with implicit movement: 
 
(16) a. Mindjárt itt a karácsony. ‘Christmas is almost here’ 
 b.  *Mindjárt karácsonynál vagyunk. ‘We are almost at Christmas’ 
 
There is again a clear pattern concerning the differences in the frequency of use 
of the two metaphors – as in Croatian, sentences illustrating the Moving-Ego 
metaphor are outnumbered by their counterparts with the Moving-Time, where 
both are available: 
 
Table 4. Differences in the frequency of the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego  
metaphors in Hungarian (as of March 5 2017). 
 
 
Google 
“közeledik a Karácsony” ‘Christmas is approaching’ 53,700/173 
“közeledünk a Karácsonyhoz” ‘We are approaching Christmas’ 2,770/79 
“Karácsony rohan” ‘Christmas is rushing’ 85 
“rohannunk Karácsonyhoz” ‘we are rushing towards Christmas’ 0 
“Húsvét jön” ‘Easter is coming’ 1,070/170 
“Húsvéthez jövünk” ‘We are coming to Easter’ 0 
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The situation in German is very similar to what we have seen in Croatian and 
Hungarian. Sentences illustrating the Moving-Time metaphor are far more 
frequent than their Moving-Ego counterparts: 
 
(17) a. Weihnachten nähert sich in großen Schritten [...]6 ‘Christmas 
  is approaching with great strides’ 
 b. ... dass wir uns mit großen Schritten Weihnachten nähern. ‘... that 
we are approaching Christmas with great strides’ 
 
 
 Table 5. Differences in the frequency of the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego 
metaphors in German (as of 5 March 2017). 
 
 
Google 
“Weinachten nähert sich” ‘Christmas is approaching’ 181,000/181 
“wir nähern uns Weihnachten” ‘We are approaching Christmas’ 2,350/90 
 
Although we have so far assumed that the two metaphors are statistically 
speaking on equal footing in English, this is not borne out by a Google query, as 
can be seen in Table 6 below. Although they do not treat explicitly Moving-Ego 
metaphors as such in their corpus study Schmidt and Omazić (2011) show that 
the Moving-Time metaphor is clearly more frequent in their samples in Croatian 
than in English, which indirectly suggests that this difference might be 
compensated by a larger number of Moving-Ego metaphors in English. The 
second number following the slash in the right-hand column is the number of 
what Google offers as the most relevant results (after deduplication, etc.). 
Although the figures are not always proportional, it is clear that the Moving Ego 
metaphors (cells in grey in the table) occur with a much lower frequency. 
 
Table 6. Differences in the frequency of the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego metaphors  
in English (as of 6 February 2017). 
 
 Google 
“Christmas is approaching” 1,850,000/207 
“we are approaching Christmas” 7,870/168 
“Christmas is coming” 8,770,000/137 
“we are coming up to Christmas” 7,500,000/120 
                                                          
6 https://de-de.facebook.com/hotel.schloss.mittersill/photos/a.329980500382107.75184.32878679 
7168144/944988938881257/. 
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As far as English is concerned, these results seem to be in keeping with Radden 
(2011: 32), who lists Google hits for similar examples in English, Chinese and 
Japanese: 
 
Table 7. Differences in the frequency of the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego metaphors  
in English, Chinese and Japanese. 
 
  English Chinese Japanese 
Moving Time approaching 1,760,000 201,000 8,970 
Moving Ego approaching 142,000 1,830,000 365,000 
Moving Time has arrived 197,000 44,900 54,100 
Moving Ego has arrived 74,000 162,000 337,000 
 
Note that this is somewhat unexpected in light of the findings of Gentner, Imai 
& Boroditsky (2002), as discussed above. The figures for Chinese appear to be 
in keeping with the results of the study by Huang & Hsieh (2007), but part of the 
difference may be attributed to the fact that many of the examples that are listed 
in the literature (from Lakoff and Johnson, 1980 onwards) for the Moving Ego 
(as well as for the Moving Time) metaphor are doubtful, as observed by Evans 
(2003: 67). Commenting on examples like We’re getting close to the start of the 
school year and She is past her prime, he notes that: 
 
Grady appears to be assuming that phrases such as the holiday season, my favourite 
part of the piece, the start of the school year, her prime etc. index the primary target 
concept time. 
However, this begs the question as to what makes the primary target concept 
temporal. After all, sentences which reveal a similar pattern, in which a change in a 
world-state is elaborated in terms of Motion, […] are treated as evidencing the 
primary metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION (and not one of the two variants of TIME IS 
MOTION)… 
 
In other words, the figures for the Moving Ego metaphor in Chinese may be 
exaggerated due to questionable examples. However, the figures for Japanese 
are certainly at odds with Suzuki (2015). Moore provides (18) a. and b. as 
examples for the Moving Time metaphor (2014: 14) and the Moving Ego 
metaphor (2013: 87) in Japanese, respectively: 
 
(18) a. Kurisumasu ga  tikaduite-kita. 
   Christmas  NOM approach-come.CONTIN 
   ‘Christmas is coming near (i.e. approaching).’ [Hirose 2013] 
  b. Saki  ni  ikeba  iku  hodo okane ga nakunaru 
   ahead DAT go:CND  go  farther money NOM become:scarce 
   “The more ahead [I] go, [to that degree] money becomes scarce.” 
   ‘The farther [I] go, the poorer [I] become.’ 
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Suzuki (2015: 102f) shows that while Time moving metaphors are acceptable in 
Japanese, their Moving Ego counterparts are not: 
 
(19) a.  shimekiri-ga chikadsuite-ki-ta 
   deadline-NOM come closer-come-PST 
   “The deadline is coming closer.” 
  b. ?shimekiri-ni chikadsuite-ki-ta 
   deadline-OBL come closer-come-PST 
 
(20) a. 3-nen-no tsukihi-ga nagare-ta 
   3-year-GEN years-NOM flow-PST 
   “Three years have passed.” 
  b. *3-nen-no tsukihi-ni nagare-ta 
   3-year-GEN year-OBL flow-PST 
  
In general, Suzuki (2015) finds that the Moving Time metaphor is more frequent 
in Japanese than the Moving Ego. 
Romanian is apparently similar to Croatian, Hungarian, German, English, 
and Japanese, showing the same sort of asymmetry: 
 
(21) a. Tiptil, Crăciunul se apropie. ‘Slowly, Christmas is approaching’ 
  b. Desi ne apropiem de Craciun,... ‘Although we are slowly ap-
proaching Christmas’ 
 
 Table 8. Differences in the frequency of the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego  
metaphors in Romanian (as of 5 March 2017). 
 
 
Google 
“Crăciunul se apropie” ‘Christmas is approaching’ 304,000/210 
“ne apropiem de Crăciun” ‘We are approaching Christmas’ 20,800/112 
 
Neagu (2008: 144) notes that: 
 
While American English provides various linguistic realizations of this model, 
foregrounding active agents and deliberate action of these agents, Romanian phrases 
and sentences instantiating the Moving Ego Metaphor are relatively few… 
 
(22) a. Ne apropiem de sfârşitul meciului. 
lit. We are approaching the end of the match, ‘we are approaching 
full time’ 
 b. Mă apropii de cincizeci de ani.  
  lit. I’m approaching fifty, ‘I’m almost fifty’  
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3. Motivating the asymmetries and contrasts 
 
In a search for an explanation of the asymmetries observed in a number of 
languages concerning the distribution of the two types of time metaphors as well 
as for the contrasts between languages concerning the frequency of a given type 
of metaphor one could start from several points of departure. It could be 
assumed, for one thing, that the observed cross-linguistic differences and 
similarities may have to do with a different status of the two metaphors in 
question. 
Recall that we mentioned that Grady (1997b: 119) takes both of these 
metaphors to be primary ones. However, we might suppose that the cross-
linguistically less frequent type of two metaphors, viz. the Moving Ego, is 
actually not a primary metaphor, but a complex one, and that some of its various 
component parts somehow more or less do not agree with or fit into the larger 
figurative system of these languages. After all, as pointed out by Kövecses 
(2005: 4), primary metaphors are likely to be universal, while the complex ones 
are more likely to be language-specific. 
Evans (2013: 243), however, casts doubts on the status of both the Moving 
Ego and the Moving Time metaphor as primary ones. He claims that these 
metaphors 
 
… actually amount to what Grady refers to as complex metaphors - they are not comprised 
of phenomenologically simple facets of embodied experience. (Evans 2013: 244)  
 
Evans (2004: 212) goes on to claim that these are culturally constructed complex 
cognitive models, i.e. they “consist of independently-motivated sets of temporal 
lexical concepts, and the elaborations associated with this range of concepts.” 
Now it turns out that, regardless of whether Grady or Evans is right, the two 
metaphors are intrinsically no different from each other concerning their status, 
i.e. that it is not the case that one of them is primary and the other compound, we 
need to check whether there may be some elements of these two cognitive 
models that inhibit one and/or facilitate the other. 
It transpires from the above data that the distribution of the time metaphors is 
different in different languages. In fact, experimental studies show that there is a 
lot of variation among speakers belonging to a single linguistic community. In 
some studies it was shown that it is possible to manipulate speakers, i.e. prime 
them in certain ways so as to produce utterances illustrating with one or the 
other metaphor.  
Margolies and Crawford (2008) examined whether affect might influence the 
choice between the two time metaphors under study here, i.e. whether positive 
and negative events are associated with different time metaphors. The results of 
their experiments show that participants who imagined a negative event were 
more likely to report that the event was approaching them, whereas those who 
imagined a positive event were more likely to report that they were approaching 
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the event. Experiments also indicated that participants judge an event to be more 
positive if it is described from the ego-moving perspective than if it were 
described from the time-moving perspective.  
Richmond, Wilson and Zinken (2012) report that participants who adopt an 
ego-moving representation exhibit significantly higher agency scores and 
significantly higher future time perspective scores than those with time-moving 
perspective. Participants adopting a time-moving representation reported 
significantly higher present fatalistic scores as well as significantly higher 
present hedonistic scores than participants with an ego-moving representation. 
Their study also shows that participants with an ego-moving representation 
reported significantly higher scores for happiness than those with time-moving 
representations. The latter reported significantly higher state and trait anxiety 
scores and depression scores than participants who indicated an ego-moving 
representation. What is more, Richmond, Wilson and Zinken (2012) argue that 
our representation of time is a fairly malleable, bidirectional relation obtaining 
between time representation and emotional experiences in the sense that 
manipulating the former has an effect on the latter and vice versa. 
In a similar study, Duffy and Feist (2014) concentrate on how lifestyle and 
personality factors in two groups of participants with very different expectations 
concerning their structuring of time (university students in one group, and 
university administrators in the other) may influence the choice between the two 
perspectives, i.e. whether one is more likely to use a Moving-Time or a Moving-
Ego metaphor. University students more frequently adopted the Moving-Ego 
perspective, while the opposite was true of administrators. Their experimental 
data also show that there is a correlation between adopting a Moving-Ego 
perspective and higher procrastination scores on the one hand, and lower 
conscientiousness scores on the other. Participants adopting this perspective also 
evidence higher levels of extroversion than those adopting the Moving-Time 
perspective.  
These studies appear to invite us to draw a number of (sometimes conflicting) 
conclusions. Some of them suggest that there are some more permanent factors 
that might influence the choice across the population. Generalizing from this, we 
might assume that the differences we have observed above simply reflect 
differences between cultural-linguistic communities in the sense that in a given 
society hedonism, procrastination, active lifestyle, egotism, etc. may be more 
prevalent than in some other societies.  
Radden (2003: 237) argues that Moving Ego model, implying static time, is 
inconsistent with our folk view of moving time. Neagu (2008: 144) links the 
small number of linguistic realizations of the Moving Ego metaphor in 
Romanian to a more passivity-oriented attitude to time and life in general. The 
Japanese situation, as described in Suzuki (2015), may be linked to such cultural 
model of proactivity or passivity. This is very similar to what was observed in 
Schmidt and Brdar (2012), where the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A GAMBLING 
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GAME was found to be frequently used in English, Croatian and Hungarian, but 
its lexicalization forms differed across languages. Gambling is a heterogeneous 
phenomenon including a broad range of activities, ranging from betting to card 
games such as poker, to lottery and bingo. Generally, these can be roughly 
divided into two large groups: active (cards and betting) and passive gambling 
(like tickets and lottery). The wording of their metaphors reveals that Croats and 
Hungarians are obviously fond of passive gambling, while English seems to be 
more in favour of using active gambling metaphors. 
But there are also seem to be some structural correlates that may help 
complete the picture. Radden (2011: 29, fn 22) notes that: 
 
Like many scholars, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) do not distinguish between static and truly 
motional terms and include under their moving observer metaphor cases such as Will you 
be staying a long time or a short time? and He’ll have his degree within two years, which 
are static situations whose duration may be conceived of in terms of fictive motion. 
 
The close links between time metaphors and fictive motion are also suggested in 
Boroditsky (2000), Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002), and Matlock, Ramscar and 
Boroditsky (2005). It has been shown (Boroditsky 2000) that in neutral contexts 
people answer ambiguous time questions from ego- and time-moving 
perspectives equally often, but that it is possible to entice speakers to assume 
either the ego- or the time-moving perspective by giving them a task with either 
imaginary or real manipulation of objects in space. Boroditsky and Ramscar 
(2002) showed that subjects primed to think of objects coming toward them 
through space were more likely to think of time as coming toward them, i.e. 
more likely to use the Moving-Time metaphor. On the other hand, subjects 
primed to think of themselves as moving through space showed the opposite 
pattern. They found that actual spatial motion is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to influence people’s thinking about time. Rather, it is thinking about 
spatial motion that seems to underlie thinking about time. In a follow-up study, 
Matlock, Ramscar and Boroditsky (2005) demonstrate that engaging in thought 
about abstract motion can encourage people to take an ego-moving perspective, 
which in turn, encourages them to “move” forward through time.  
The phenomenon of fictive motion was first applied by Talmy (1983, 1996, 
2000) to descriptions in which settings that are factively stationary are construed 
as moving. Among the many subtypes of fictive motion, such as Emanation 
Paths (which can be Orientation paths (23) a., Radiation paths (23) b., Shadow 
paths (23) c., etc.), Frame-relative motion (24), Advent paths (25), etc. the most 
important for us is the Coextensive path fictive motion, illustrated in (26). The 
following are examples from Talmy (2000: ch 2): 
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(23) a. I/The arrow on the signpost pointed toward/away from/into/  
past the town. 
 b. The light is shining (from the sun) into the cave/onto the back 
  wall of the cave 
 c. The pillar cast/projected a shadow onto/against the wall. 
 
(24) I sat in the car and watched the scenery rush past me. 
 
(25) Termite mounds are scattered/spread/distributed all over the plain. 
 
(26) a. The path runs along the beach. 
 b. The beach runs along the town before coming to a disused harbour 
made up of a long sweeping seawall and many rockpools inside. 
 
McGlone and Harding (1998: 1211) note that the relationship between Moving 
Ego and Ego-centered Moving Time is analogous to the relationship between 
factive motion (ordinary motion regarded as real) and fictive motion. Factive 
motion and frame-relative fictive motion can be seen as Figure-Ground reversals 
of each other. The same could be said of Moving Time and Moving Ego 
metaphors. This means that there is an analogy between Moving-Ego/Ego-
centered Moving Time and factive/fictive motion. According to Moore (2014: 
56) the way the same information is construed differently in (27) is parallel to 
how Moving Ego and Ego-centered Moving Time construe the same information 
differently in (28): 
 
(27) a. He was rushing toward the brick wall (as he realized that his  
   brakes had failed). 
 b.  The brick wall was rushing toward him (as he realized that his brakes 
had failed). 
 
(28)  a.  We are fast approaching the end of the semester. 
 b.  The end of the semester is fast approaching. 
 
In addition to this analogy, we should also note a sort of cross-matching between  
(27) b. and (28) a.; the wall, i.e. the Ground-turned-Figure, is factively static, but 
is construed as moving, while the observer, we, is construed as moving instead 
of time, Figure-turned-Ground. Both of these run contrary to common-sense folk 
models. 
Matsumoto (1998) reports that not all objects can be described by a fictive 
motion expression in Japanese. Unlike in English, nontravellable paths, that is, 
paths which cannot be travelled by humans, such as walls and fences, cannot be 
used in Japanese fictive motion constructions. This means that there is a sort of 
correlation between Moving Ego and fictive motion, both being subject to 
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restrictions. In other words, we might expect that other languages that exhibit a 
pronounced asymmetry in the use of time metaphors, favouring the Moving 
Time type, might also exhibit similar constraints concerning the use of fictive 
motion construction. 
Let us now consider how some examples of prototypical fictive motion 
constructions are rendered in Croatian: 
 
(29) a. The road runs to the left. 
 b. The road leads to the famous volcano Osorno. 
 c. The fence runs through private property… 
 d. The beach goes from Viareggio in the south to the border of 
Liguria,…. 
 e. The beach runs from the Shallow Inlet entrance to the small 
settlement of Waratah Bay, at the western end of the beach. 
 
(30) a. Cesta vodi/skreće na lijevo. Lit. ‘the road leads/turns to the left’ 
 b. Cesta vodi prema poznatom vulkanu Osorn. Lit. ‘the road leads to the 
famous volcano Osorno’ 
 c. Ograda ide preko privatnog posjeda… Lit. ‘the fence goes across 
private property’ 
 d. Plaža se prostire od Viareggia na jugu to granice s Ligurijom,… Lit. 
‘the beach stretches/extends from Viareggio in the south to the border 
ot Liguria,…’  
 e. Plaža se prostire od ulaza u Shallow Inlet to malog naselja u Zaljevu 
Warath, na desnom kraju plaže. Lit. ‘the beach stretches/extends 
from the Shallow Inlet entrance to the small settlement of Waratah 
Bay, at the western end of the beach’ 
 
It turns out that in the case of coextension path type of fictive motion 
constructions in Croatian, virtually all dynamic construals of a situation based on 
verbs that are counterparts of verbs like run, move, etc. are not acceptable. 
Instead we find verbs denoting slow movement like ići ‘go’, voditi ‘lead/guide’, 
change of direction such as skretati ‘turn’, or verbs denoting no movement but 
denoting rather static situations like spanning, such as prostirati / pružati/ 
protezati se ‘extend /stretch/ spread (itself).’ Notice that the English counterparts 
of these verbs, extend and stretch, can also be used in such contexts, though in 
some cases the meaning of the whole might be slightly different. Notably, they 
are possible in contexts like (29) b., d. and e., but they are nevertheless used 
considerably less frequently than lead or run, which are felt to be more 
idiomatic. This means that when translating sentences like (30) d. and e. into 
English we can expect, depending on the experience and skill of the translator, 
more or less correct translations resulting in the overuse of extend or stretch and, 
conversely, the underuse of run, which would be more natural choice, and 
statistically speaking more frequent one. In other words, instead of an 
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asymmetry obtaining in the case of translating from English into Croatian, while 
we would have its levelling in the case of translating from Croatian into English. 
The constraints observed are similar to what Suzuki reports for English and 
Japanese, which means that Croatian and Japanese again exhibit the same 
tendency. However, on the basis of the examples like (30) above, and (31) 
below, there also appear to be are some differences between Croatian and 
Japanese: 
 
(31) a. Zapadno od Bola, pruža se/*vodi/*ide/**trči plaža Zlatni rat... ‘West 
   of Bol there extends/*leads/*goes/runs the Golden Horn beach’ 
 b. Plaža se proteže 4 kilometra duž obale... ‘The beach stretches for 4 
kilometres along the coast’ 
 
Apart from subjects, i.e. moving Ground-turned-Figures, denoting items whose 
primary function is transport (the travellable ones), verbs of slow movement are 
also compatible with non-travellable but traversable, elongated locative objects, 
such as fences, gates. The most static verbs of the extend type are found with 
locative objects that are neither travellable nor traversable. The same seems to be 
true for Hungarian (32), and German (33): 
 
(32) a. Hová vezet az út? ‘where does the road lead?’ 
 b. Arra, amerre a kerítés megy… ‘there, where the fence goes to…’ 
 c. A Parador Hotel golfpályája mögött húzódik meg ez a strand. ‘that 
beach stretches behind the Parador Hotel golf course’ 
 
(33) a. Die Straße führt in die Berge. Lit. ‘the road leads into the hills’ 
 b. Der Zaun gehr rund um das Haus rum. Lit ‘the fence goes around the 
house’ 
 c. Der Strand erstreckt sich meilenweit nach Süden. Lit. ‘The beach 
stretches (lit. stretches itself) for miles to the south’ 
 
At the moment we can only speculate about the reason for these constraints and 
more research is necessary, on more languages and based on more data. One of 
the possible reasons could be the semantic clash between a dynamic motion verb 
and the Ground-turned-Figure. We could say that the clash is removed in 
Croatian, Hungarian and German, where static verbs of the extend-type are used 
instead of a dynamic one. The semantic clash is not so open in English due to the 
fact that dynamic verbs such as run or go exhibit a great deal of polysemy. They 
can serve grammatical functions, i.e. they can be used as resultative copula 
verbs, go can be used for future time reference (going to), as well as in many 
well-entrenched collocations, with these verbs having a near grammatical role 
(e.g. run danger / risk / test / business, etc.).  
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
In the introductory section, we stated that the data gained through the translation 
method can be a very useful complement to other types of data in cognitive 
linguistics, bridging the gap between intuition and some more empirical sources 
of data. Naturally, this applies to the research on metaphor as well. Combining 
translation with the contrastive approach may help uncover not only the 
conditions of their use at the token level, but also patterns of their use in the 
cultural and discoursal context. 
We demonstrated this by taking a very close look at some cross-linguistic 
asymmetries in the use of two types of time metaphors, the Moving-Time and 
the Moving-Ego metaphor in a number of languages, such as English, German, 
Croatian, Hungarian, and Romanian. The Moving-Ego metaphor appears to be 
far less frequently used in languages such as Croatian or Hungarian, i.e. some of 
its lexicalizations are less natural than their counterparts based on the Moving-
Time metaphor, while some others are, unlike their English counterparts, clearly 
unacceptable.  
The differences are attributed in part to different cultural models of 
proactivity or passivity, but also to semantic clash brought about by not adhering 
to the folk model of time and its default assignment of roles of Figure and 
Ground in the Moving Ego metaphor. The same counterintuitive assignment of 
these two roles is observed in the fictive motion construction of the coextension 
path type, which is the mirror image of the Moving Time metaphor, which 
means that there is a correlation between the lower frequency of the Moving 
Ego, on the one hand, and the constraints on the fictive motion construction, on 
the other, as corroborated by Japanese, Croatian, Hungarian and German data. 
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